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"! understand as well as any one what people are saying . . . . But I can only
1
do my duty by my client to the best of my judgment." So says Sir William
Patterson, the hero of Anthony Trollope's novel Lady Anna, at a time when he
has come under severe criticism. He has just behaved in what seems a most
unlawyerly fashion: he has persuaded his client to drop a case that, if successful,
would have been worth a good deal of money. He has done so, the Bar believes,
because "[i]n lieu of regarding his client, he had taken upon himself to set things
right in general, according to his idea of right."' As Lady Anna unfolds,
however, it turns out that Sir William has been lookiog out both for "right in
general" and for his client, on whom the opposing party later voluntarily settles a

* Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank the American Inns
of Court and their panel of reviewers, Stephen Gillers, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Nancy J. Moore, and
Robert M. Wilcox, for the Warren E. Burger Prize. I also thank Sarah E. Merkle, Adam J. Hegler,
Carlyle R. Cromer, and other editors of the South Carolina Law Review.
1. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, LADY ANNA 324 (Stephen Orgel ed., Oxford Univ. Press World's
Classic ed. 1990) (1874) [hereinafter LADY ANNA].
2. Id. at 323.
439

440

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62: 439

large sum of money. By moving the parties from litigation to trustful
reciprocity, Sir William brings about the best possible outcome.
Although Trollope wrote Lady Anna in 1874, his portrayal of Sir William
has great relevance today. There is perennial debate among legal ethicists about
how lawyers should balance their duties to their clients with their responsibilities
as moral persons within society 3 In Lady Anna, Trollope reminds us that while
this debate is an important one, there are also times when farsighted lawyers can
fulfill their duties to their clients in ways that benefit everyone involved.
This Essay looks at one possible way that lawyers can achieve such
outcomes. Under certain circumstances, lawyers can best serve both their clients
and the broader good by practicing what I call the ethic of high expectations. A
lawyer acting from the ethic of high expectations gives advice that will be fully
effective only if both the lawyer's client and the other party voluntarily and
independently relinquish legal rights in order to further the broader good. The
lawyer succeeds by shifting the conversation from being about legal rights to
being about right outcomes.
In defining and advocating the ethic of high expectations, I rely on two very
different types of sources. The first is Lady Anna. Although Trollope's Orley
Farm has fascinated present-day legal ethicists with its portrayals of lawyers,<
Lady Anna has received virtually no attention. 5 Part I outlines the plot of Lady
Anna and introduces the wonderful Sir William Patterson. Part II then analyzes
Sir William's choices from a legal ethics standpoint. More specifically, this Part
uses Sir William's conduct to frame the concept of the ethic of high expectations
and further argues that, for the most part, this conduct would pass muster under
the legal ethics regimes prevalent in the United States today.

3.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR., ETIDCS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 12()-35 (1978)
(noting that a lawyer needs "extraordinary technical skill [and] an unusually disciplined sense of
probity" if he is to «be at once a champion in the forensic roughness and a guardian of the temple of
justice"); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19-64 (2007) (discussing tension
between "the morality of conscience" and "the claim that professional obligation can override it");
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 24-{;1 (2d ed. 1860) (taking up

question of "what are the limits of [a lawyer's] duty when the legal demands or interests of his
client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right").
4. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 3, at 302 ("[Orley Farm] is a great novel about legal ethics
. . . ."); Sanford H. Kadish, Moral Excess in the Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 64 (2000)
(describing Orley Farm as a "fine Victorian novel"); Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral
Teacher, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 195, 209 (1986) ("My favorite legal example of contempt for the
profession as moral teacher occurred ... in Trollope's Orley Farm."); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal
Ethics as "Political Moralism" or the Morality of Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1413, 1427-28
(2008) (commenting on Troll ope's characters from Orley Farm).
5. Lady Anna has won occasional praise in the legal world, but this praise dates far back in
the past. See, e.g., Henry Drinker, The Lawyers ofAnthony Trol/ope, in HENRYS. DRINKER, Two
ADDRESSES DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF THE GROLIER CLUB (1950), reprinted in FED. LAW., Jan.
2008, at 50, 56-58 (discussing the character of Lady Anna's Sir William Patterson); John H
Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. REV. 574, 592 (1908) (noting ''Novel[s] in which a
lawyer, most of all, ought to be interested" and including Lady Anna on his list).
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A lawyer practicing the ethic of high expectations must have a client willing
to act with good will toward the other party-and willing to gamble that the
other party will reciprocate. Part III turns to a very different set of sources to
show why clients might be willing to act in this way. In particular, this Part
draws upon insights developed from experiments in the field of economics,
particularly behavioral economics, regarding people's preferences for fairness
and reciprocity and the ways in which their market norms relate to their social
norms. Part III argues that these insights both support tbe feasibility of the ethic
of high expectations under certain circumstances and enrich tbe understanding of
how it can be sustained in practice.
Finally, Part IV considers the circumstances under which lawyers today
could practice the ethic of high expectations. This Part does not suggest that the
ethic of high expectations will work in all or indeed many cases. Nonetheless,
the ethic of high expectations is underutilized, whether from lawyers' disinterest
in thinking "outside the box," desire for business, fear of malpractice suits, or
other motives. Part IV accordingly identifies characteristics of cases and areas of
law where the ethic of high expectations might prove appropriate.
I.

TROLLOPE'S SOLICITOR-GENERAL

A. Lady Anua in Brief

Lady Anna begins grimly. The nefarious Lord Love] marries a young
woman but tires of her shortly before the birth of their daughter Anna. He tells
his lady that their marriage is a farce-that he has a prior wife already in Italy. It
is unclear whether he is telling the truth, but his lady has no reliable way of
verifying or refuting his claim. Lord Love! then leaves England to live on the
Continent. In his absence, his lady does everything she can to emphasize the
validity of their marriage, including insisting that she be called the "Countess"
and that Anua be known as "Lady" Anna. During these years, the Countess and
Anua are taken in by a kindly tailor, Thomas Thwaite, who devotes a great deal
of time and money to helping them.
Fast forward twenty years to Lord Lovel's death. Lord Lovel's title and
modest landed property pass to his nearest male relative, whom I shall refer to as
the young Earl, but it is unclear who will inherit his fabled wealth. Once some
6
dust has settled, two viable claimants remain: Anua and the young Earl Anna
will inherit if she is legitimate, and the young Earl will inherit otherwise. The
burden of proof is on the young Earl.

6. Two other possible claimants appear at various times. One is Lord Lovel's mistress at
the time of his death-an Italian woman to whom he leaves his money in his will. See LADY ANNA,
supra note 1, at 15-16. The will is invalidated on the grounds of insanity in the second chapter of
Lady Anna, and that is the last we hear of this claimant. !d. at 20. The remaining claimant is a
(different) Italian woman who claims to have married Lord Lovel before he "married" the Countess.
See id. at 42--43. Her proofs of this marriage are extremely dubious. See id. at 42-44.
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At this point, Trollope introduces the lawyers-and there is no shortage of
them. For Anna, we have Mr. Goffe as solicitor and Mr. Mainsail as junior
barrister, while the lead barrister, Serjeant Bluestone, is "a very violent man,
taking up all his cases as though the very holding of a brief opposite to him was
an insult to himself."7 For the young Earl, who has the deeper pockets, we have
more prestigious lawyers: Mr. Flick the solicitor, Mr. Hardy, Q.C., as second
barrister, and Sir William Patterson, the Solicitor·General of England, as lead
barrister.' The case appears headed to court, as the Countess (who acts as
Anna's guardian) has angrily rejected an offer that Anna's claim oflegitimacy be
abandoned in exchange for 30,000 pounds.
Mr. Flick goes to Italy to investigate the case. He returns with the unhappy
impression that Anna is in fact legitimate. Some evidence suggests that Lord
Love! did have a prior wife in Italy, but the evidence further indicates, though
not conclusively, that this woman died before Lord Love! married the Countess.
Mr. Flick relays this information in guarded terms to Sir William. They
conclude that the best result for their client will be for him to marry Anna. This
will settle the suit and provide the young Earl with all the wealth he could hope
to win. Anna will go along, they reason, because this approach would give her
the certainty of her wealth, undisputed legal and social acceptance of her
legitimacy, and a share in the young Earl's title and land. After some difficulties
with Serjeant Bluestone, who has "never heard anything more irregular in [his]
life,"9 they put the idea to the parties.
The young Earl, who is decent, attractive, and tractable, is willing enough,
and the snobbish Countess is positively thrilled by the idea. But Anna initially
resists. She likes the young Earl, but she has a prior secret engagement to Daniel
Thwaite, a tailor who is the son of Thomas Thwaite. The rest of the book turns
on two questions: First, will Anna's resistance continue; and second, how will
the inheritance dispute be resolved? The answer to the first question is a rather
tedious yes. It is the second question that keeps the reader-or at least the
lawyer reader-turning the pages eagerly.

7. !d. at48.
8. Prior to the 1890s, the Solicitor-General of England could take cases in private practice in
addition to his work for the Crown. See Walter Preston Armstrong, A Famous English K.C., 29
YALEL.J. 718,727 (1920).
9.
LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). A letter from
Anna's lawyers to the young Earl's lawyers expressed a similar sentiment:
Should the Earl of Love! seek the hand of his cousin, the Lady Anna Love!, and marry
her ... , we should be delighted at such a family anangement; but we do not think that
we, as lawyers,-or, if we may be allowed to say so, that you as lawyers,-have anything
to do with such a matter.
Jd at 69. Mr. Hardy also resisted this approach, feeling that "it wasn't law." Id at 92.

'
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The Unconventional Sir William Patterson

So far, the character of Sir William is understandable enough. He is an
10
exceptionally able lawyer, blessed with "the gift of seeing through darkness."
He has the judgment to recognize a weak case and the imagination to identify a
clever, if unusual, solution. He has the energy and confidence to pursue this
solution despite the resistance of the other lawyers. Indeed, he is not above
bending the rules a little: when Setjeant Bluestone refuses to put the marriage
idea to his client, Sir William goes behind his back through a third party. And
while affable, Sir William also has an advocate's edge, as shown when he
delicately warns the (poorer) other side that "if the law be allowed to take its
11
course" then the matter "may,-I fear it must,-take years to prove." With his
brilliance, his common sense, and his persuasiveness, he gains the respect of
almost all the interested non-lawyers. Not long after Sir William suggests a
settlement by marriage, the Countess has "already begun to have more faith in
the Solicitor-General than in [her own lawyers] Mr. Goffe [and] Serjeant
12
Bluestone."
But when Anna's resistance to marrying the young Earl becomes clear, Sir
William shows an unconventional side. On a personal level, he is the only
person with any sympathy for Anna's insistence that she will marry the lowly
Daniei. 13 On a professional level, he acts in what seems like a very unlawyerly
way: he persuades the young Earl to abandon his legal claim to the money. At
the scheduled court hearing, Sir William argues that Anna is in fact legitimate
and that judgment should be entered in her favor. This outrages the young Earl's
nearest relative, the rector of Yoxham, who goes "about declaring that the
14
interests of the Love! family had been sacrificed by their own counsel." And
the rector is not alone:

10. !d. at 46.
11. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 88.
13. The Countess is horrified to the point of abusiveness at the thought of Anna marrying
Daniel. See id. at 213. As for the other lawyers, the following exchange sums it up:
"The marriage would be too incongruous," said Mr. Hardy.
"Quite horrible," said the Seljeant.
"It distresses one to think of it," said Mr. Gaffe.
"It would be much better that she should not be Lady Anna at all [i.e., legitimate], if
she is to do that," said Mr. Mainsail.
"Very much better," said Mr. Flick, shaking his head, and remembering that he was
employed by [the young Earl] and not by the Countess-a fact of which it seemed to him
that the Solicitor-General altogether forgot the importance.
"Gentlemen, you have no romance among you," said Sir William. "Have not
generosity and valour always prevailed over wealth and rank with ladies in story?"
!d. at318.
14. Id. at 323.
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There were very many who ... agreed with the rector in thinking
that the Earl's case had been mismanaged. There was surely enough of
ground for a prolonged fight to have enabled the Love! party to have
driven their opponents to a compromise. There was a feeling that the
Solicitor-General had been carried away by some romantic idea of
abstract right, and had acted in direct opposition to all the usages of
forensic advocacy as established in England. What was it to him
whether the Countess were or were not a real Countess? It had been his
duty to get what he could for the Earl, his client. There had been much
to get, and with patience no doubt something might have been got. But
he had gotten nothing. Many thought that he had altogether cut his own
throat, and that he would have to take the first "puny" judgeship vacant.
"He is a great man,-a very great man indeed," said the AttorneyGeneral, in answer to someone who was abusing Sir William. "There is
not one of us can hold a candle to him. But, then, as I have always said,
he ought to have been a poet!" 15
Despite all the criticism, Sir William's choice proves inspired. Anna
eventually offers half of her wealth to the young Earl. With Sir William's
approval, he accepts the gift. Sir William's work does not stop here, however.
He then persuades the young Earl to host the wedding of Anna and Daniel
"exactly as though [the young Earl's family was] all proud of the connection.""
Sir William further persuades Daniel (who has a proud Radical side) to accept
this arrangement. The book closes with the wedding, and even here "[t]he hero
of the day was the Solicitor-General." 17 Sir William has manufactured the best
18
The young Earl now has money to support his titlepossible outcome.
something that Trollope, who was no radical, presumably viewed as a socially
19
Anna has Daniel, substantial wealth, and undisputed
valuable outcome.
legitimacy. Finally, the two sides have developed a warm family relationship.
While an arms-length settlement could have achieved some of these outcomes, it
seems impossible that such a settlement could have resulted in the young Earl's
getting so much money, in Anna's legitimacy being as widely accepted socially,

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 348.
I d. at 493.
Id. at 507.

Once all is said and done, Sir William receives much praise. See id at 508. His client is
thrilled, observing that "[i]fwe had gone on quarrelling and going to law. where should I have been
now? I should never have got a shilling out' of the property." !d. at 489 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Pleasingly, however, Trollope leaves one dissenter: the rector of Yoxham remains
convinced to his dying day that "[i]f the lawyers had persevered as they ought to have done, it
would have been found out that the Countess was no Countess, that the Lady Anna was no Lady
Anna, and that all the money had belonged by right to the [yotmg] Earl." Id. at 495 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

19. See ANfHONY TROLLOP£, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 142 (Univ. Cal. Press 1947) (1883)

(displaying a distinct preference for the upper class).
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and in the two ending up with such a cordial cousinly relationship. Sir William
has brought happiness beyond what the law could have provided.
II.
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SIR WILLIAM DECONSTRUCTED

Why does Sir William act the way he does? Why does he persuade his
client to abandon a suit that has some chance of success? In hindsight, the
choice is a brilliant one, but at the time it seems like a most improbable decision.
In this Part, I first explore what motivates Sir William to act as he does and
argue that he acts primarily from his sense of duty to his client, although this is
leavened with a strong desire for a good outcome all around. This Part then
turns to the question of how Sir William achieves his motives and argues that, in
choosing to drop the suit, he relies on what I call the ethic of high expectations.
Finally, this Part considers whether Sir William's ethic of high expectations
would pass muster under the ethical rules prevalent in the United States today.
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Sir William's decision to drop the lawsuit "in direct opposition to all the
20
usages of forensic advocacy" lies at the heart of Lady Anna. It is a puzzling
choice, but the text suggests four possible motives.
First, Sir William at one point suggests that the decision is not his: he is
simply following the instructions of the young Earl, who is convinced that Anna
is in fact legitimate. 21 This explanation does not seem compelling, however, in
light of all the influence that Sir William has over his extraordinarily docile
client. The young Earl is "inclined to be submissive in everything to his great
adviser"22 and throughout the novel he follows Sir William's advice. If the
young Earl has instructed Sir William to drop the case, it is because Sir William
has advised him to do so.
Second, there is the possibility that Anna will still come around and marry
the young Earl (a possibility that surely would have been lost had the young Earl
23
persisted in legally disputing her legitimacy). Perhaps due to hasty drafting,

20. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 348.
21. See id. at 324 (explaining to Mr. Hardy that "[l]et an advocate be ever so obdurate, he can
hardly carry on a case in opposition to his client's instructions" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. !d. at 437.
23. A quick writer and a light editor, Trollope frequently has inconsistencies in his writings.
See VICTORIA GLENDINNING, TROLLOPE 331 (1992) ("Critics complained of carelessness and
infelicities of style and grammar."); TROLLOPE, supra note 19, at 287 ("Every word of [Lady Anna)
was written at sea ... and was done ... for eight weeks, at the rate of 66 pages of manuscript in
each week, every page of manuscript containing 250 words."). Lady Anna itself contains obvious
inconsistencies. See Drinker, supra note 5, at 58 (describing inconsistencies in Trollope's portrayal
of Sir William's character). Compare LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 190 (describing how Sir
William shows full knowledge of the debt owed by the Countess to Thomas Thwaitc), with id. at

I

I'
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Trollope offers conflicting accounts of Sir William's views here. At one point
late in the book, Sir William holds out hope that this marriage will happen after
all 24 But immediately after the trial, Sir William expresses grave doubts about
the likelihood of this marriage-he observes that Anna "seems to have a will of
her own, and that will is bent the other way."25 This observation seems truer to
Sir William's usual perspicuity than does the passage in which Trollope
describes Sir William as holding out hope for the marriage. Because of thisand because the decision to drop the case is more interesting if Sir William has
low hopes for a marriage-! consider that the prospect of a marriage between the
cousins did not substantially motivate Sir William's decision to abandon the
lawsuit.
Third, there is the motive that the rector of Y oxham and the profession at
large attribute to Sir William: that he acts out of "some romantic idea of abstract
light. " 26 This motive is more plausible. Throughout Lady Anna, Sir William
displays sympathy and understanding toward all persons concerned in the case.
He comes to believe that Anna is, in truth, legitimate and asks "[w ]ho would
wish to rob the girl of her noble name and great inheritance if she be the heiress?
Not I, though the [young] Earl be my client."27 Perhaps Sir William persuades
his client to give up his lawsuit simply because it is the morally right thing to do.
Fourth, there is the possibility that Sir William is just doing what lawyers
ordinarily do-acting in the best interest of his client. On this theory, Sir
William has made a calculated determination that the young Earl has a better
chance of financial success if he drops the suit and trusts Anna's generosity than
if he pursues the suit. Again, this motive is plausible. Sir William does not
think much of his client's odds at trial, and he is aware that Anna may be
generous. Just after the decision to drop the suit, he observes that "! do think
that a settlement may be made of the property which shall be very much in the
[young] Earl's favour."28
There are two plausible motives, then: that Sir William acts out of some
romantic idea of abstract right and that he acts to further the best interests of his
client. These two motives ultimately prove compatible in this case, and Sir
William seems to have a healthy dose of each. But which motivation is pdmary?
As an author, Trollope is celebrated for his ability to leave interesting questions
open for his readers to wrestle with,29 and this is one of those questions. Cdtics

317 (describing how Sir William first learns of the amount of the debt owed by the Countess to
Thomas Thwaite).
24. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 413-14 (describing Sir William as "still of [the]
opinion that the two cousins might ultimately become man and wife if matters were left tranquil and
the girl were taken abroad for a year or two").
25. I d. at 325 (intemal quotation marks omitted).
26. I d. at 348.
27. Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 3, at 318, 328 (arguing that in Orley Farm, Trollope takes
an "agnostic" stance on core moral questions related to the main character's forgery of a codicil to a
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of Lady Anna have taken different views on the issue. English professor R.D.
McMaster reads Sir William as motivated mainly by the greater good. 30 He
argues that "[t]he complaints of [Sir William's] colleagues, that he appeals to
'the light of his own reason', to 'his idea of right', to 'something of his own',
indicate that, unlike most Trollopian lawyers, and in accord with Trollope's
ideals, [Sir William] consults an inner light of truth."31 By contrast, Henry
Drinker, a mid-twentieth-century Philadelphia lawyer, legal ethicist, and
32
Trollo~ian, portrays Sir William as focused primarily on the interests of his
3
client.
Sir William was not only able to look into the future, but having done
so, could weigh accurately the different alternatives, with but one
consideration-the best interest of his clients; never permitting the
gaudium certaminis-the craving to accomplish the immediate
objective-to divert him from his primary duty to serve the client.

. . . [Sir William] knew that he might rely on Lady Anna's
generosity, on the adequacy of the estate to care for them all, and on
Lady Anna's pride in her family, as appealing forces which would
induce her to make adequate provision for the head of the family, so that
the title might be supported witl1 becoming dignity and splendor. 34
The practicing lawyer Drinker thus takes Sir William as focused
primarily on his client's interest, 35 while the English professor McMaster
reads Sir William as motivated mainly by a sense ofright. 36

will and subsequent confession); William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal Ethics:
Three Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1365, 1372 (2008) (considering that Orley
Farm is best read as leaving in equipoise the tension between legal and moral norms); cf R.D.
MCMASTER, TROLLOPE AND THE LAW 6 (1986) ("As many scholars have observed, however,
[Trollope's] novels are singular for the degree to which they sympathetically present all sides of an
issue .... ").
30. See MCMASTER, supra note 29, at 131.
3!. Id.
32. See Austin W. Scott, Book Review, 64 HARV. L. REV. 522, 522 (1951) (describing
Drinker's background as a Trollopian). See generally HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIIICS (1953)
("To many lawyers it has . , . seemed essential that om lawyers and law students should have a
modem book on [legal ethics] which would apply the eternal principles to present conditions,
embody those dealing with the new developments, ... and also make available a summary of the
principles established by the many written decisions which have been rendered during the past thirty
years by the ethics committees of the different bar associations construing the Canons.").
33. See Drinker, supra note 5, at 56---57.
34. I d. at 57.
35. See id. at 50, 56~57.
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In my view, the two motives are closely connected. I agree with Drinker
that Sir William's primary motivation is his duty to his client. After all, Sir
William himself says so, telling Mr. Hardy that "I understand as well as any one
what people are saying . . . . But I can only do my duty by my client to the best
of my judgment." 37 But it is Sir William's sense of abstract right that enables
him to form the view that dropping the suit will be good for his client. This
sense tells him in the first instance that Anna should be recognized as legitimate.
It tells him more, however-it also tells him that it would be good for the young
Earl to have some money to support his title and for the family members to be on
harmonious terms with each other. Once Sir William has come to this broad
vision of abstract right, he recognizes that it will be in his client's best interests
to achieve it, and he acts accordingly. His moral sense has thus shaped his
judgment as to how he can best serve his client.
B.

The Ethic ofHigh Expectations

When his initial idea of resolution by marriage fails, Sir William has the
greatness to imagine a fallback solution that is good for all parties and satisf'ying
in the abstract. Perhaps even more impressively, however, he brings this
solution to pass. He does not do so through the conventional machinery of law
or settlement. Instead, he practices what I will call "the ethic of high
expectations": he gives advice that will only be effective if his client and the
other party voluntarily and independently relinquish legal rights in order to
further the broader good. Sir William's vision will only come true if the young
Earl abandons his legal suit, if Anna then offers the young Earl money, and if the
young Earl then treats Anna and Daniel as family. There is no contractual titfor-tat in these exchanges; instead, each party acts honorably and generously,
trusting that the other party will in tum be honorable and generous.
I use the term "ethic" to reflect the fact that, as discussed in the prior section,
Sir William's course of action is rooted in a view not only of what is good for his
client, but also of what satisfies the broader good. This is an imprecise use of the
word, but it captures the moral force of Sir William's vision. It also conveys the
point that Sir William's "high expectations" for the parties are rooted in his
confidence in his vision. Sir William gambles that the fundamental rightness of
his vision will be evident to his client and to Anna as well. He himself has
stepped away fi·om the role of a lawyer, read narrowly, and he trusts that the
young Earl and Anna will similarly step out of their roles as clients interested
only in what they can get. He has asked them to abandon litigation and hardnosed settlement negotiations in favor of fairness and trust.
Sir William does not practice the ethic of high expectations in a vacuum. By
the time he persuades the young Earl to drop the suit, he has had a chance to

36. See MCMASTER, supra note 29, at 131.
37. LADY ANNA, supra note I, at 324.
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observe both parties. He knows that the young Earl is a decent sort, and one who
will respect his advice. He has some sense of Anna's personality as well. Her
decision to stand by Daniel rather than accept the very appealing young Earl
suggests not only that she is true to her word, but also that she honors her debts
(for Daniel's father Thomas supported Anna and the Countess for many years) .
Sir William also !mows that, despite the bad blood between the two branches of
the family, Anna and the young Earl have grown to like and respect each other as
individuals. The young Earl finds Anna beautiful and appealing,38 while Anna
considers the young Earl "not a lover, but simply the pleasantest friend that
fortune had ever sent her."39
These factors no doubt influence Sir William's willingness to rely on the
ethic of high expectations. Nonetheless, Anna is not Sir William's client and he
has no control over her actions. In trusting her generosity, Sir William is making
a bold gamble. While Drinker thinks that Sir William "knew" that Lady Anna
would end up giving the young Earl money,'0 I think this point is less certain and
thus more interesting. Sir William himself only says that he thinks this "may"
happen 41 He is betting on Anna's ethical sense, but he knows that he is betting.
His decision to take a chance and trust to the decency of the other party is so
unusual that it flummoxes both the other attorneys around him and non-law
onlookers like the rector ofYoxham.
C.

The Ethics of the Ethic ofHigh Expectations

In Sir William's day, barristers absorbed their ethical training durin§
4

pupilages at the Inns of Court and did not practice under written ethical codes.
By contrast, lawyers in the United States today typically act subject to statebased written rules of ethics. 43 In this section, I consider whether Sir William's
ethic of high expectations would pass muster under these rules, since only if that
is the case can this ethic have practical relevance for American lawyers today.
More specifically, I evaluate Sir William's actions in relation to the American

See id. at 242-43.
Id at 155.
Drinker, supra note 5, at 57.
LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 325.
See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57
REV. 1385, 1401 (2004) (citing Anthony Thornton, The Professional ResponsibUity and
Ethics of the English Bar, in LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 53, 55 {Ross
Cranston ed., 1995)). Not unti11980 did English barristers have a written code of conduct. See id
at l402n.l31.
43. See Links to Other Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Pages, A.B.A.,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.htmi#States (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (providing links to the state
ethics codes).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
SMU L.
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Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), since
most state rules are based on these Model Rules. 44
The Model Rules recognize that lawyers can act in various roles, each of
which gives rise to different obligations. Lawyers can have single clients, they
can act for multiple clients, or they can be third-party neutrals, such as arbitrators
or mediators. 45 Sir William fits readily into the first category. Although his
sympathy and vision give him a whiff of acting more broadly, as a formal matter
he is a lawyer with one client-the young Earl-and must be evaluated as
such 46
For lawyers acting for clients, the Model Rules prioritize "the lawyer's
obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within
the bounds of the law."47 This position is by no means as absolute as Lord
Brougham's famous dictum that "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty,
48
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client," but it
49
undeniably takes a client-centric approach. Lawyers are there to look out for
their clients' legitimate interests, whether or not these interests are compatible
with what I am terming (admittedly loosely) the broader good. Of course,
lawyers can try to shape their clients' understandings of their interests. Model
Rule 2.1 advises that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's

44. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Dates of Adoption, A.B.A.,
http;//www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (providing a list of
dates when states adopted the Model Rules and showing California as the only state absent from the
list); Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, ST. B. OF CALI., http://www.calbar.org/
proposedrules (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) (covering proposed revisions to the California Rules).
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 2.4 (2010).
46. Sir William is thus distinct from what Justice Brandeis called a "lawyer for the situation,"
see HAZARD, supra note 3, at 58-59, and what, prior to its deletion in 2002, Model Rule 2.2.
described as the role of "intermediary," compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt.
(2000) (amended 2002) (discussing the situation where a lawyer "represents two or more patiies
with potentially conflicting interests" and "seek[s] to establish or adjust a relationship between
clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2010) (indicating that the rule was deleted in 2002). Nonetheless, Sir William
acts rather like Geoffrey Hazard's ideal of a "lawyer for the situation"-he undertakes "forms of
intercession suggested by the models of wise parent or village elder" and acts "on implicit
principles of decision that express commonly shared ideals in behavior rather than strict legal right."
HAZARD, supra note 3, at 64---62; see also David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2067 (1997) ("[T]he lawyer for the situation ... seem[s] to be stretching the
conventional defmition of [the] role[], almost to the edge of legitimacy."). Hazard seems to view
these modes of acting as limited to the "lawyer for the situation," see HAZARD, supra note 3, at 6167, while I suggest in this Essay that, under certain circumstances, a lawyer with a specific type of
client can undertake them.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para 9 (2010).
48.

2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1874).

49. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 159 (1988).
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situation." 50 But when push comes to shove, the "lawyer shall abide by a client's
51
decisions conceming the objectives of representation. "
As discussed earlier, Trollope leaves open whether Sir William considers his
primary obligation to be to his client or to achieving a just outcome. If the latter,
then Sir William's conduct would not be in keeping with the client-centric
approach that animates the Model Rules. As I argued in the prior section,
however, I read Sir William as prioritizing his duty to his client. While he has a
vision of the broader good-and a decided preference for giving advice of the
52
non-legal sort that is included in Model Rule 2.1 -he believes that he is
pursuing the interests of the young Earl to the best of his abilities. His greatness
comes not from disregarding the client-centric model of lawyering (a model that
I do not question in this Essay) but rather from achieving his client's objectives
by using the ethic of high expectations.
Not only does Sir William satisfY the general balance struck in the Model
Rules between a lawyer's duty to his client and to broader principles, but he also
conducts himself in keeping with most of the more specific Model Rules. He is
53
diligent and prompt in accordance with Model Rule 1.3 -even breaking up an
August trip to retum to London to meet with his client. 54 He communicates
55
amply with the young Earl as called for under Model Rule 1.4. He is a little
loose about client confidences, but his behavior may still pass muster under
Model Rule 1.6.56 He has no conflicts of interest that might violate Model Rule
1.7.57
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MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010).
MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010).

53. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 {2010) ("A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
54. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 188-89.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010) ("A lawyer shall ... promptly
inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed
consent ... is required by these Rules .... ");LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 190--91 (discussing his
plan for the case with the young Earl).
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010) ("A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent .... ").
This issue arises after Anna tells the young Earl about her secret engagement to Daniel. See LADY
ANNA, supra note 1, at 166. The young Earl requests Anna's permission to tell Sir William about
this, but implies that he does not intend to tell anyone else. ld at 186. Upon heating the news, Sir
William "disregarded altogether his client's injunctions as to secrecy," feeling that "in a matter of so
great importance it behoved him to look to his client's interests, rather than his client's
instructions." Jd. at 204. On its face, this incident seems contrary to Model Rule l.6's bar on a
lawyer's "reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent [or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to cany out the
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). But Sir William has explicitly
warned the young Earl that he will disclose this information, telling the ymmg Earl that "[t]he
matter is too heavy for secrets." LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 192. The Earl's silence in the face of
this warning, see id., combined with Sir William's need to reveal the information thus could well
amount to an implied authorization under Rule 1.6. In any event, the incident is not crucial to the
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In at least one respect, however, Sir William's conduct sits uneasily with the
requirements of the Model Rules. The Model Rules set forth clear constraints on
communications between an attorney for one client and other parties. Model
Rule 4.2 bars a lawyer from communicating with a represented party without the
permission of that party's attomey,58 and Model Rule 4.3 requires that a lawyer
neither imply disinterest in the case when communicating with non-represented
third parties nor give advice to persons whose interests have a reasonable
possibility of conflicting with his client's interests. 5 9 Sir William pushes the
boundaries of these rules-and in some instances violates them-in the course of
his constant communications with all interested parties. Early in Lady Anna, he
acts in a way that would violate Model Rule 4.2 by going behind Serjeant
Bluestone's back to put the idea of settlement-by-marriage to Anna via an
intermediary. 60 He does this after Serjeant Bluestone has refused to put the idea
of settlement-by-marriage to Anna (a refusal that in tum would amount to a
violation of Model Rule 1.4(a)(l)).61 With regard to non-represented parties
such as the Countess and Daniel, Sir William does not repudiate their views of
him as an honest broker, which indeed in some sense he is. He also doles out
advice to them, although this occurs after the young Earl has formally abandoned
his legal claim to the money. 62
Lawyers practicing under the Model Rules cannot duplicate Sir William's
free-wheeling approach to communications with other parties. At the very least,
a lawyer today would have to clear any communications with the opposing party
with that party's counsel,"' clarify her interests to non-represented parties,6 and
avoid advising parties with potential conflicts. 65 These obligations do not
directly conflict with the ethic of high expectations, but they do make it harder

plot, and the secret itself is hardly the usual client confidence since it is the secret of Anna (the
opposing party) rather than the young Earl.
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010) (providing guidelines for lawyers
"if the representation [of a client] involves a concurrent conflict of interest").
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
lmows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer .... ").
59. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010).
60. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 69-71, 81-82. Comment 4 to Model Rule 4.2 specifies
that "[a] lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of
another." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 4.2 cmt. 4 (2010).
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (2010) ("[A] lawyer who receives
from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy ... must promptly infmm the
client of its substance .... ");LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 68-69. Eventually, Serjeant Bluestone
is so overwhelmed by Sir William that he consents in allowing Sir William to communicate directly
with Anna. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 240--41,277.
62. See LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at428, 499-502,
63. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010).
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010).
65. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2010).
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for a lawyer to get a handle on the character of the opposing party and to
communicate the lawyer's vision of a just solution to all the interested parties.
I will come back to this point later in this Essay," 6 but first I take up a more
fundamental concern, one that lies at the border of ethics and practicality. Model
Rule 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
67
client." In hindsight, at least, it is plain that Sir William provides his client
with more than competent representation. The young Earl ends up rich and is
very pleased with the outcome. But Sir William and his client are fictional, and
Sir William succeeds by throwing a court case. If the ethic of high expectation is
to work in reality-in other words, if it can indeed be practiced by competent
lawyers-then there must be some real-life justification for its efficacy. It is to
this that I tum next.
Ill. LADY ANNA AS AN ECONOMIC GAME

Sir William's ethic of high expectations depends on the good will of his
client and the client on the other side. For this ethic ever to be appropriate, there
must be some basis for assuming that, under certain circumstances, clients will
independently surrender rights in the interests of the broader good. In this Part, I
draw upon insights from behavioral economics literature to offer such a basis.
Specifically, I rely on evidence that people exhibit substantial tastes for fairness
and reciprocity and that they respond to situations quite differently based on
whether they perceive these situations as involving social norms or market
norms. This evidence, which parallels Lady Anna in interesting respects,
validates the practicality of the ethic of high expectations under certain
conditions.
A. Fairness and the Dictator Game
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An experiment known as "the dictator game" demonstrates that people have
social preferences for fairness rather than being purely interested in maximizing
68
their own profits
The basic structure of the dictator game is quite simple.
There are two players and a pot of money (say $10). The first player (the
dictator) decides how to divide up the money, and then the money is divided up
between the two players according to that allocation."' The game is played only
once between the players. 70

eives
n the
>tone
ectly
66. See infra Part IV.A.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.l (2010).
68. See Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMEs &
ECON. BEHAV. 347, 362...fi3 (1994).
69. Id. at 350.
70. Id. at 349.
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If everyone was driven by pnre profit maximization, then in the dictator
game the dictator would keep the entire pot of money. 71 In practice, a large
percentage will in fact keep the entire pot, but the rest will give something to the
other player, with a substantial minority giving fully half away. For example, in
one study 36% of participants gave away nothing, 22% gave away au equal share
or more, and the other 42% gave some amount in between. 72 The decision to
deviate from the ~urely selfish choice is thought to arise at least partially from
norms of fairness. 3
The evidence from the dictator game partially validates the practicality of Sir
William's ethic of high expectations. Although it is hard to know how much
carries over from the simple experimental setting, the dictator game provides an
empirical basis for fmding it plausible rather thau wholly naive to expect that
people are motivated by fairness, even in one-shot transactions where they face
no repercussions from being greedy. Indeed, the second half of Lady Anna
resembles a large-scale dictator game. Sir William effectively hypothesizes that
after the case is dropped and the money is entirely in Lady Anna's hands, she
will behave like a benevolent dictator aud offer a substantial portion of her
fortune to the young Earl-even though, like the dictators in the dictator game,
she is tmder no formal obligation to do so. Sir William guesses correctly, and in
giving the young Earl half her money, Anna acts like the most generous of the
dictators?4
Two variants on the dictator game offer additional insights for the ethic of
high expectations. First, studies show that the more dictators feel entitled to
their money, the less willing they are to part with it. A dictator who becomes the
dictator based on superior performance to the other player-such as a better
score on a pop quiz--is significantly more stingy on average than a dictator who

71. See id at 348.
72. See id. at 362 (describing a $5 dictator game). In a $10 dictator game, 21% gave nothing,
another 21% gave an equal share, and the rest gave an amount in-between. See id.; Elizabeth
Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON.
REV. 653, 653-54 & fig.l (1996) (testing six different variants of the $10 dictator game and finding
that, depending on the variant, from 18% to 64% of dictators gave nothing, while between 8% and

32% gave $4 or more).
73. See Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral
Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 366--67 (1999) (finding in an experiment aimed at simulating
settlement negotiations that people show preferences for fairness, although they are somewhat selfinterested in how they frame fairness); Forsythe, supra note 68, at 363; cf Colin Camerer &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216
(1995) ("We conclude that the outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other bargaining
games have more to do with manners than altruism.").
74. An interesting consideration, which I will not explore further, is how Anna's gender may
relate to her benevolence as a dictator. One study of the dictator game has found that on average
female dictators share twice as much as do male dictators. See Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J.
Grossman, Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments, 108 ECON. J.
726, 730 (1998).
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is assigned to the role by chance." 5 This fact has several implications for the
ethic of high expectations. First, it implies that the ethic of high expectations is
likely to be more effective in cases where people feel a lower sense of
entitlement to the rights they are giving up. Second, it suggests that the ethic of
high expectations has the greatest potential early on in cases. The more rulings
there are by the court (e.g., on motions to dismiss or on summary judgment), the
more entitled the winning party is likely to feel and thus the less likely it is to
give rights up independently and voluntarily.
A second set of variants on the dictator game shows that social distance
affects the generosity of the dictator. Where the amount a dictator offers is
unknown to everyone but the dictator, then dictators become stingier, with one
study finding that fully 64% of dictators kept all the money 76 By contrast, the
more contact there is between the dictator and the experimenter, the more the
dictator is likely to give. 77 Similarly, the more the dictator knows about the
recipient (e.g., name, photograph, face-to-face encounter), the more the dictator
is likely to give. 78 In some ways, this bodes well for the ethic of high
expectations, as parties headed toward legal disputes are likely to know each
other. Indeed, in Lady Anna, Sir William does not advise the young Earl to
abandon the lawsuit (and thus trust Anna's generosity) until Anna and the young
Earl have had ample time to get to know and like each other. But the amicable
personal relations between Anna and the young Earl are undoubtedly far from
the norm in cases that are litigated. It is unclear whether decreased social
distance is an advantage where the social relations at issue are tense rather than
neutral or positive.
The dictator game thus provides modest support for the ethic of high
expectations. It affirms the principle that many people will act altruistically out
of a sense of fairness even when they are under no obligation to do so and would
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75. See Karl Schurter & Bart J. Wilson, Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game, 76 S.
ECON. J. 130, 133-34, 136 tbl.3 (2009) (finding that dictators gave away an average of 18% when
picked based on seniority, 24% when picked based on superior performance on a quiz, 34% when
picked by a dice roll, and 35% when assigned the role without explanation).
76. Hoffman et al., supra note 72, at 653.
77. See id. at 658 ("Our data supports the hypothesis that as social isolation increases there is
a further shift toward lower offers."); cf Mary Rigdon et al., Minimal Social Cues in the Dictator
Game, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 358, 359 fig.l, 363 (2009) (finding that male dictators give more in
the presence of three dots that look like "watching eyes" than in the presence of three dots arranged
in a neutral shape).
78. See Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in
Dictator Games 89 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 336-37 (1999) (finding that dictators offered more when
they and the recipients were identified and told to make eye contact than when they did not lmow
the identity of the recipients); Terence C. Burnham, Engineering Altruism: A Theoretical and
Experimental Investigation of Anonymity and Gift Giving, 50 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 133, 136,
138 tbl.l (2003) (finding that dictators give more when they see pictures of the second players);
Gary Chamess & Uri Gneezy, What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and
Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 29, 31, 32 tbl.l (2008) (finding that dictators gave a
mean of approximately 27% where they lmew the family name of the second player but only
approximately 18% where they did not know the name).
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face no repercussions from doing otherwise. But the dictator game also raises
concerns for the ethic of high expectations, since many dictators keep all the
money to themselves, others give only a little, and variants on the study suggest
that generosity will be more limited where dictators feel stronger senses of
entitlement. Moreover, nothing about the dictator game suggests that it leads to
better results for the second player than a bargain would. Indeed, in a similar
game known as "the ultimatum game" in which the second player has the power
to decline the first player's offer such that no one gets any money, the first
players offer more money on average to the second players than they do in the
dictator game 79 If the ethic of high expectations ever has advantages over pure
horse-trading, then support for these advantages must come from elsewhere.

B. Reciprocity and the Trust Game
An experiment called "the trust game" suggests that people have social
preference for reciprocity. In this two-player game, which is similar to "the
investment game," the first player (the investor) is given some amount of money
(say $10). She can invest any amount of this money with the second player (the
trustee). When the money goes to the trustee, it increases (say triples) in value,
and the trustee can then decide how much, if any, to return to the investor 80 In
effect, once the investor has sent the money to the trustee, the trustee is in the
same position as the dictator in the dictator game.' 1
If all actors acted out of pure self-interest, then trustees would keep all
money sent to them.'2 And investors would anticipate this, so they would not
send trustees any money in the first place. 83 In fact, investors typically send
substantial amounts of their money to trustees, and trustees typically return
substantial amounts back to investors.'4 In one study in which each investor had
$10 and any part ofthat sent to the trustee would triple in value, investors sent an
average of $5.16 to trustees, who returned an average of $4.66 to investors. 85 Of
the 28 trustees in this study who received money, there was wide variability in
the responses: 12 sent back $0 or $1, II sent back more than the investors' initial

79. See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 73, at 210, 213; Forsythe, supra note 68, at 349,362.
80. See Joyce Berget al., Trost, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
122, 123 & n.l (1995) (citing David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 100 fig.l (James E. Alt & Kenneth A.
Shepsle eds., 1990)). The trust game I describe here is played once between players, see id; it can
be played multiple times as well, however. See Brooks King-Casas et al., Getting to Know You:
Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic Exchange, 308 SCI. MAG. 78, 78 (2005) (studying
the changes in subjects over the course of repeated trust games).
81. See Berget al., supra note 80, at 127.
82. See id. at 126.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 131, 134.
85. See id. at 124, 131; cf id. at 132, 134 (describing another experiment in which, after
subjects were given information about the first experiment, the investors sent an average of $5.36
and the trustees returned an average of $6.46).
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investments, and the remaining 5 sent back money less than or equal to the initial
investments. 86 Another study has found that trustees are significantly more
willing to return money to the investors when the investors have voluntarily
trusted them with money than when the investors have been required to invest
money. 87 These studies suggest that people are willing both to trust and to
reciprocate, with reciprocation being stronger where trustees can infer that
investors have trusted them.
Lady Anna has even more parallels to the trust game than to the dictator
game. The first half of Lady Anna is somewhat like the first stage of a trust
game: the young Earl acts like a trusting investor in surrendering his own legal
claim to the money and instead recognizing Anna's claim to it The results of
the basic trust game provide support for Sir William's intuitions that the young
Earl can be persuaded to act as he does (because most investors do in fact choose
to make investments) 88 and that Anna may reciprocate (because although many
trustees keep all the money, many other trustees do reciprocate generously). As
discussed earlier, Lady Anna does indeed prove to be a generous trustee/dictator
and gives half her money to the young Earl. Her incentives to act this way not
only include fairness as discussed earlier in relation to the dictator game but also
reciprocity in response to the young Earl's trust in her. We then see one further
round of the trust game, in which the young Earl reciprocates Anna's generosity
by hosting her wedding and thus cementing her social place in the Love! family.
In the trust game, trust and reciprocity help capture the potential increase in
the investment despite the absence of any contract between the investor and the
trustee. 89 The absence of a contract in the trust game is due to necessity: there is
no opportunity for the investor and the trustee to communicate other than
through their money-transferring choices, and thus no opportunity to form a
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86. !d. at 131.
87. See Kevin A. McCabe et al., Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games, 52 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 267, 272 fig.3, 273 fig.4 (2003) (finding that in a study where trustees
entrusted with $20 could either return $25 to the investor and keep $25 for themselves or return $15
to the investor and keep $30 for themselves, 65% of trustees chose the generous $25/$25 approach
where the investor had been given a choice about whether to make the $20 investment, while 67%
of trustees chose the less generous $15/$30 approach where the investor had no choice but to make
the $20 investment).
88. See Berg et al., supra note 80, at 137 (noting that investors sent money fifty-five out of
sixty times). Because the young Earl's likelihood of success on the legal merits is substantially
weaker than Anna's, see LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 91, his "investment" further resembles the
investments in the trust game in holding out the prospect of increased returns, see Berget al., supra
note 80, at 124-25.
89. Of course, reciprocity plays significant roles in the formation of contracts, including
settlement agreements. See, e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in
Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOTIATIONL. REV. 1, 40--41,51-52 (1999) (discussing
the psychological role of reciprocity in negotiating civil settlements); Russell Korobkin, A Positive
Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1822 (2000) ("A common negotiating tactic is to
make an extreme opening offer, perhaps one that is far outside of the bargaining zone, in the hopes
of then invoking the reciprocity norm to reach an advantageous deal point.").
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contract. 90 While this kind of situation can arise naturally, as shown in the facts
of the famous case of Webb v. McGowin, 91 in almost all cases involving lawyers,
the parties will have ample chances to settle by contract. Thus, while the trust
game provides more insights into why the ethic of high expectations might work
in practice, it still does not show that the ethic of high expectations might
sometimes be superior to a negotiated settlement.
C.

Market Norms and Social Norms

An interesting line of experiments suggests that framing exchanges in social
terms will sometimes generate better outcomes than framing exchanges as
bargains. In a study that Dan Ariely and James Heyman conducted, participants
were divided into three groups and asked to perform the same exercise over and
over on the computer screen for five minutes, namely, dragging a circle into a
square, at which point that circle would disappear and a new circle would
appear. 92 At the beginning of the experiment, one group's members were told
they would be paid 50¢ for their time, one group's members were told they
would be paid $5 for their time, and one group's members were asked to perform
the exercise as a favor. 93 Surprisingly, the third group-the group that was not
paid-dragged the most circles on average (168), while the group paid $5
dragged an average of 159 circles, and the group paid 50¢ dragged a measly
average of 101 circles. 94
In explaining this result, Ariely considers that "we live simultaneously in
two different worlds--{)ne where social norms prevail, and the other where
95
In the market world, "[t]he exchanges are
market norms make the rnles."
sharp-edged ... [and] imply comparable benefits and prompt payments," while
in the social world the ~Ieasure of giving and receiving favors and a sense of
community motivate us. 6 In his experiment, the unpaid subjects outperformed
the paid subjects because their social-world-based motivations were greater than
the market-world-based motivations of the paid subjects (who, after all, were not
being paid all that much). A real-life example comes from the AARP's attempt

90. See Berget al., supra note 80, at 128-29.
91. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 196-97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (requiring an heir to

continue making payments to a former employee of the decedent where, years earlier, the employee
was seriously injured in saving the decedent's life and the decedent then promised to pay the
employee a bi-weekly stipend for the rest of the employee's life).
92. See DAN ARlELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 69-70 (2008).
93. See id. at 70.
94. Id. at 70-71. A less contrived experiment by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini reaches a
similar result. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON.
791, 798-800 (2000) (fmding that high school students asked to volunteer their time in collecting
money for charity ended up collecting more than students who were paid for their time with a
percentage of the donations).
95. ARIELY, supra note 92, at 68.
96. !d.
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to find lawyers willing to represent needy retirees: When the AARP asked
lawyers if they would be willing to take ou such clients at the reduced rate of $30
an hour, the lawyers declined, but when asked to take on these clients for free,
the lawyers agreed to do so. 97 Ariely explains that the lawyers reacted in
market-norm mode to the $30-an-hour proposal and accordingly did not think it
was a good deal, but they reacted in social-norm mode to the request that they
98
freely give their time and therefore responded generously.
In Lady Anna, Sir William can be described as moving the parties from
market-norms mode into social-norms mode. At the beginning of the book, the
discussions between the parties are purely in market terms, as shown by the
attempt to get the Countess to surrender Anna's claim for 30,000 pounds. By the
end of the book, however, Sir William has transitioned the parties' relations to
the social sphere, and they have acted generously and high-mindedly towards
each other.
The differences between social norms and market norms also help explain
two reasons why unnegotiated reciprocal gestures may, at times, be better than
settlement agreements. First, it may be that such gestures can reduce transaction
costs. The hassle and expense of litigation have always been with us: As
George Sharswood put it long ago, "[i]t happens too often at the close of a
protracted litigation that it is discovered, when too late, that the play has not been
worth the candle, and that it would have been better, calculating everything, for
the successful party never to have embarked in it-to have paid the claim, if
defendant, or to have relinquished it, if he was plaintiff."99 While negotiated
settlements can reduce transaction costs in comparison to litigation to final
judgment, these costs can remain significant, particularly if there is a lot of presettlement litigation, such as discovery or back-and-forth dming the settlement
process. Moreover, people are prone to biases that make settlement more
difficult to achieve. Among other things, they suffer from what economists call
100
"a self-serving bias-to conflate what is fair with what benefits onesel("
I
have not seen studies on whether people are less prone to these biases when
acting in social mode than when in market mode, but that might well be the case.
In any event, unnegotiated reciprocal gestures with regard to certain aspects of a
case may reduce transaction costs for a negotiated settlement of the remainder
101
(for example, by increasing trnst).
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97. See id. at 71.
98. See id
99. SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 52~53.
100. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110 (1997). Recognition of this bias existed well
before the term "self-serving bias" was coined. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 51 ("(I]t is often
very hard to persuade a man that he has not the best side of a lawsuit: his interest blinds his
judgment .... ").
101. See Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1830 (noting that trust increases negotiating power).
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Second, and more significantly, unnegotiated reciprocal gestures can
generate surplus. In the unpaid version of Ariely's study, everyone is better off
than in the paid version: the experimenters get their circles dragged for free,
while the subjects gain satisfaction from doing the favor that is greater than the
satisfaction of the subjects who make $5 or 50¢ (as shown by their comparative
work ethics). 102 In Lady Anna, similarly, the move from market mode to social
mode creates surplus. It is possible to imagine a bargain that "I won't contest
your legitimacy if you give me half the money." But such a bargain would leave
whispers open about Anna's legitimacy and would hardly further close family
relations.
Surplus from non-market exchanges can arise even in the course of
relationships that are largely market-based. In a seminal paper, George Akerlof
103
proposed the idea that labor markets can involve partial gift exchanges
Akerlof was trying to explain why a group of workers with little chance of
promotion worked harder than the minimum work standards (though with
substantial variation across workers )104 Akerlof concluded that the best
explanation was that the workers developed "sentiment" for their company such
that they gave the "gift" of superior work, and the company in return ?ave them
10
the gift of wages above what they might have received elsewhere.
Akerlof
convincingly explains why this added exchange should be viewed not as a
contract but as the exchange of reciprocal gifts and further whl, this reciprocal
1 6
While not all
exchange of gifts benefits both the company and the workers.
market relationships will incorporate such social norms, and while not all social
norms will create surplus, 107 the widespread mixing of market and social norms
does provide further support for the feasibility of the ethic of high
108
expectations.

102. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at 70--71.
103. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gifl Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543,
549 (1982).
104. See id. at 543.
105. !d. at 543-44.
106. See id. at 549-55. Evidence of the mixing of market norms and social norms has been
observed in settings as widely varied as day care arrangements and firefighter benefits. See Uri
Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2000) (discussing how
introducing fines for late child pickup in dayMcare centers increased the amount of late pickups);
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 636 (2010) (discussing issue in the context of firefighters' sick-leave
policy).
107. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 106, at 664---65 (arguing that liquidated damages clauses
can promote efficient breach by moving parties from a social norm against breaking agreements to a
market norm).
I 08. Moreover, this surplus can disappear through the process of settlement negotiations
through a phenomenon known as "crowding out." See id at 665. The very act of trying to bargain
over or monetize something viewed as a social norm can cause people to change their views and
treat it as something in the market sphere. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at 77; Gneezy & Rustichini,
supra note 106, at 14; cf Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination ofScientific
Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 510 (2010)
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The dictator game, the trust game, and studies on social norms and market
norms do not fully validate Sir William's decisions. Not all dictators are
benevolent; not all people trust or are worthy of trust in the trust game; and
social norms will not affect parties to many cases. Nonetheless, these
experiments provide some support to the ethic of high expectations and offer
insights into when it can succeed. They suggest that fairness, trust, and
reciprocity can sometimes occur without negotiated agreements among complete
strangers and that unconditional reciprocal exchanges can sometimes generate
better results than formal contracts. They thus suggest that, at times, the ethic of
high expectations can "temper[] the innocence of the dove with the wisdom of
109
the serpent."
The trick is determining when it can do so.
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IV. THE ETHIC OF HIGH EXPECTATIONS IN PRACTICE

In the prior parts, I have defined the ethic of high expectations and argued
that insights from behavioral economics provide qualified support for its
feasibility. In this Part, I consider the circumstances under which the ethic of
high expectations might be effective in lawyering today. I look first at
characteristics of cases where the ethic of high expectations may apply, and then
identify three sample areas of law where these characteristics can be found.
In considering possible applications of the ethic of high expectations today, I
include weaker applications of this ethic than that which occurs in Lady Anna.
While Lady Anna provides a crisp (and delightful) illustration of the ethic of
high expectations, we cannot expect many cases where one party voluntarily
abandons all legal claims at issue, the other side generously reciprocates by
splitting wealth evenly with the first party, and the two sides have cordial
relationships thereafter. Nor can we expect many lawyers to have the greatness
of Sir William Patterson. Accordingly, I include situations where a client on one
side could unilaterally and unconditionally abandon only certain rights (rather
than all relevant rights) in the hope of triggering a similar gesture of reciprocity
from the client on the other side that furthers a good outcome.
My understanding of the ethic of high expectations is otherwise the same as
discussed in Part Il.B above. In particular, it includes three limitations that I
hinted at in that section, but which I will specify in more detail here. First, the
right at issue should be one that lies primarily with the client rather than the
lawyer. In the course of most litigations, lawyers make unilateral and
unconditional concessions to each other-for example, in not opposing requests
1 10
for extensions of time -that promote civility and mutual appreciation and may
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(discussing the pressure to monetize all interests in the course of settlement negotiations). It then
becomes hard to return the matter to its original social-norm status. See ARIELY, supra note 92, at
77; Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 106, at 14.
109. LADY ANNA, supra note 1, at 113.
110. Indeed, standards of ethics often require such courtesies. See, e.g., OKLA. BAR ASS'N,
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 3.4(a) (2006), available at http://www.okbar.org/ethics/
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therefore reduce both the cost and the stress of litigation. But such modest
gestures lie between lawyers and do not involve expectations for either a
lawyer's client or the client on the opposing side. Second, the abandonment of
the right should be unilateral and unconditional. The experimental evidence I
discussed above relating to fairness and reciprocity has relevance in the context
of best tactics and conditional offers in settlement negotiations, and there is
indeed substantial literature on how lawyers can make use of social greferences
for fairness and reciprocity in the course of settlement negotiations. 11 But the
ethic of high expectations as I have defined it is about unconditional gestures of
trust. Third, the abandonment should come with the expectation of a reciprocal
gesture from the other party. Many reasons exist for lawyers to counsel clients
to abandon rights-as where the likely costs are not worth the likely gains or
where exercise of the rights would be morally indefensible." 2 Indeed, Elihu
Root reportedly once said that "[a]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer is
telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop." 113 But my
interest here is in reciprocity and in when lawyers should counsel clients to
abandon legal rights in the hopes of benefiting from reciprocal gestures.
A. Circumstances Lending Themselves to the Ethic ofHigh Expectations
A song about gambling advises, "You got to know when to hold 'em, know
when to fold 'em, know when to walk away and know when to run."ll 4 As with
good gamblers, good lawyers must have the judgment to play their cards well,
and this is particularly true of lawyers who seek to invoke the ethic of high
expectations. Like acting as a "lawyer for the situation," practicing the ethic of
high expectations is "a tricky business ... requir[ing] skill, nerve, detachment,
compassion, ingenuity, and the capacity to sustain confidence.""' It goes
against the conventional grain of adversariallawyering and will draw every eye
for its daring. If it succeeds, as with Sir William, it is likely to succeed
spectacularly, but if it fails, then it is likely to fail with a bang.

standards.htm ("We will agree, consistent with existing law and court orders, to reasonable requests
for extensions of time when the legitimate interests of our clients will not be adversely affected.");
SANTA CLARA CNTY. BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM § 4 (2007), available at

http://www.sccba.com/aboutlprofessionalism.cfm ("Consistent with existing law and court orders, a
lawyer should agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time when the legitimate interests of
his or her client will not be adversely affected.").
111. See, e.g., Birkc & Fox, supra note 89, at 40--41, 51-52 (discussing the psychological role
of reciprocity in negotiating civil settlements); Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1830 (discussing the role
of the reciprocity norm in legal negotiation).
112. Stephen Gillers, Is Law (Still) an Honorable Profession?, 19 PROF'L LAWYER, no. 2,
2009 at 23, 25.
113. Id. at 25 (citing Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
114. KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists 1978).
115. HAZARD, supra note 3, at 65.
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In deciding whether a particular situation lends itself to the ethic of high
expectations, there is no substitute for good judgment. But good judgment does
not lend itself to characterization, and I will not attempt that here. Instead, what
I offer here is meant as a supplement to good judgment: namely, three
characteristics that are usually necessary for the competent exercise of the ethic
of high expectations.
First, the ethic of high expectations must offer hope of value for both sides
beyond what a negotiated settlement could provide. If a negotiated settlement
will do the trick, then there is no reason for a lawyer to invoke the ethic of high
expectations and all its attendant risks. As I discussed in Part IILC, however, the
ethic of high expectations can sometimes reduce transaction costs or generate
surplus beyond what a negotiated agreement would do. Unconditional partial
gestures can also at times jump-start negotiations, as has graven the case in
matters as significant as the Northern Ireland peace process. ' 6 For the ethic of
high expectations to be advisable, a lawyer must believe that it offers one or
more of these advantages over a negotiated agreement and that the client could
receive at least some of the benefits of these advantages.
Second, both parties must share a sense of a broader good. At a minimum,
they should both think that there is a fair outcome that is not fully in line with
their own interests, even if they do not agree on exactly what this fair outcome
looks like. More powerfully, they should recognize that the situation is one
where positive value will come out of reciprocity, and they should be willing to
relate in social-norms mode as opposed to just market-norms mode. Only if a
lawyer has reason to believe that both parties share a sense of the broader
good-and therefore that the opposing party is likely to behave like a
trustworthy trustee in the trust game-should the lawyer invoke the ethic of high
expectations. By invoking the ethic of high expectations, the lawyer also
increases the odds that the parties will live it up to it. Just as people are more
likely to play cooperatively in a game if it is called the "Community Game"
rather than the "Wall Street Game," 117 so they are more likely to fulfill high
expectations if they are in fact confronted with these expectations.
Third, communication between the parties and the lawyers must be strong,
clear, and respectful. For the ethic of high expectations to work in practice, the
lawyer must first have a client who is willing to listen to advice that goes beyond
the four comers of the law. But this is just the beginning. The lawyer must also
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116. See Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 373, 376-377 (2006) (discussing the role of the Downing Street Declaration in the Northern
Ireland peace process).
117. See Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner's Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1175, 1177 {2004) ("It is equally clear that the name of the game exerted a
considerable effect on the participants' choices. When playing the Community Game, 67% of the
most likely to cooperate nominees and 75% of the most likely to defect nominees cooperated on the
first round. When playing the Wall Street Game, 33% of participants with each nomination status
cooperated .... ").
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have good relations with the lawyer on the other side (or the other party if
\Ulfepresented). If opposing counsel seems unlikely to act in a manner
sympathetic to the ethic of high expectations, this ethic is unlikely to work. And
because our ethical rules prevent lawyers from communicating directly with
represented parties as freely as did Sir William, 118 the lawyer also needs
confidence that the party on the other side will have a clear understanding of
what is going on and feel some pressure to make a reciprocal gesture. This
confidence could come from direct communication in the course of meetings
between all parties and lawyers, from client-to-client communications, or from a
belief that the lawyer for the other party will present matters to her client in a
way that furthers the ethic of high expectations. As the variants on the dictator
game and the trust game suggest, the party on the other side is more likely to act
generously if there is less social distance between the parties and if that party
understands clearly that the other party has placed trust in her. 119 Finally,
relations between the clients should be respectful. The parties will probably not
be on good terms with each other-indeed, the ethic of high expectations is
pm1ly about bringing the pm1ies to such terms-but strong personal dislike or
distrust likely makes all but the smallest gestures of trust unfeasible.
It may seem rare indeed that these three conditions are met. The first
condition runs contrary to the classic view of litigation as a zero-smn game; 120
the second condition calls for positive views of clients in contradiction to the
''bad man" assumption that underlies much of legal reasoning; 121 and the third
condition requires cordial communications between legal adversaries. A lawyer
may well think that these conditions are so unlikely to he met in practice that it is
not worth ever considering the matter-particularly if that lawyer is reluctant to
think "outside the box" or is overly cautious about the risk of malpractice
suits. 122 But as I will suggest in the next section, these conditions occur more
often than one might think, especially in certain areas of law. Indeed, the ethic

118. See supra Part Il.C.
119. See supra Part II.A-B.
120. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998).
121. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,459 (1897)
("lf you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
fmds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience."); cf Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETlilCS 103, 104 (2010) ("In the world of legal ethics, clients are most often constructed as
cardboard figures interested solely in maximizing their own wealth or freedom at the expense of
others."). But see Charles Fried, The Lmryer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088 (1976) (examining the case of the lawyer who has a bad
client, although acknowledging that "in ve1y many situations a lawyer will be advising a client who
wants to effectuate his purposes within the law, to be sure, but who also wants to behave as a
decent, moral person").
122. I say "overly" because a lawyer who practices the ethic of high expectations properly will
lay out its risks clearly to the client and therefore have a good shield against a possible malpractice
suit in the event that the other side fails to reciprocate.
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of high expectations is already flourishing in some areas and has potential to be
used more widely in others.

B. Some Contexts in Which the Ethic ofHigh Expectations Could Apply
The ethic of high expectations could apply in many different contexts. At
the transactional stage, the company lawyer might remind her client that, along
the lines of Akerlof's argument, paying wages above the going rate can lead to
even more valuable increases in worker productivity under the right
conditions. 123 This lawyer might also urge her client to make good on a disputed
loss with a long-time buyer in the hope that the buyer will then remain a loyal
customer. Because social norms play a significant role in ordinary business
dealings, advice that takes these norms heavily into account should hardly
occasion much controversy.
The ethic of high expectations proves more interesting in cases that are in
litigation or headed there. Of course, there are some areas of law where a lawyer
will virtually always be better off focusing on traditional settlement rather than
on the ethic of high expectations-such as in straight commercial disputes
between parties with no continuing relationship. In other areas of law, however,
a lawyer would do well to consider invoking the ethic of high expectations as a
substitute or supplement to settlement. I briefly identity three such areas here.

I.

Government Investigations of Corporations

Perhaps the most common use of the ethic of high expectations occurs in
relation to government investigations into corporate behavior. On receiving
notice of government investigations in the antitrust or securities context, lawyers
now routinely encourage their clients to cooperate from the start. 124 They often
do so without explicit deals but with the hope that the government will
reciprocate down the road by dropping the investigation or accepting a more
modest settlement than it would if confronted with full- fledged adversarial
125
resistance.
These cases typically satisf'y the criteria I identified in the prior section.
Corporate cooperation followed by governmental leniency can lower transaction
costs bl reducing the amount of legal work that both sides have to put into a
case. 12 It also generally increases surplus for the company because cooperation

123. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
124. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and
Corporate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 344-47
(2008).
125. See id at 371-72; cf Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 321-26 (2007) (discussing use of deferred prosecution
agreements, which are specific contracts).
126. See Griffin, supra note 125, at 340-42.
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is better than resistance from a reputational standpoint, and for the govermnent
because it would prefer that companies shape up rather than be driven out of
business-' 27 In terms of the broader good, the govermnent clearly has an interest
in this principle, 128 and companies presumably desire to act legally either out of
principle or reputational interests. Lines of communication will probably be
strong, particularly because government attorneys act as proxies for their
client. 129
Because the government is a repeat player with long-term incentives,
corporate lawyers can have substantial confidence that the govermnent will
reciprocate cooperative gestures. 130
Indeed, official govermnent
pronouncements make clear that cooperation will be rewarded. 131 The incentives
for corporations to cooperate are extremely strong-so strong that their
voluntariness has been questioned and adversarial resistance has been recognized
. ki er strategy. 131
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2.

Divorce

The movie Wedding Crashers begins with a scene from a divorce
mediation. 133 The parties are at· an angry stand-still until the mediators ask what
the wedding was like. 134 The parties soften, and suddenly the husband offers the
frequent flyer miles to the wife-a gesture that opens the door to resolution of
the entire case.

135

litigab
childr'
surplu
Tl
cases,
recipr•
certai1

small
theca
127. See id. at 327, 330 (citing Press Release, Dep't of Justice, America Online Charged with
Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud; Prosecution Deferred for Two Years (Dec. 15, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_790.htm) (explaining how, particularly in the
wake of the collapse of Arthur Anderson, companies wish to avoid indictments and the government
wishes to avoid inflicting significant harm).
128. See id.
129. See generally Kimberly E. O'Leary, When Context Matters: How To Choose an
Appropriate Client Counseling Model, 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 103, 106, l 14
(200 1) (discussing how some govemment attomeys act in a traditional manner as a proxy for their
clients).
130. See Griffin, supra note 125, at 316.
131. See id. at 316-21 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA:
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 19 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.
Memorandum
gov/Research!Symposium_Proceedings/Corporate_Crime/WCSYMPO_opt. pdf);
from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business
Organizations 7, available at http:www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf;
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Principles of Federal Prosecutions
of Business Organizations 7 (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf.
132. See Duggin, supra note 124, at 345 ("[R]esitance is not always futile, but it may be
fatal"); Griffin, supra note 125, at 313, 333--40, 351 (citing Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty,
supra note 131, at 10) (raising concerns that incentives for companies to cooperate are so strong that
the rights of individual employees are banned).
133. WEDDING CRASHERS (New Line Cinema 2005).
134. See id.
135. See id
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This fictional example sheds light on the very mixed potential for the ethic
of high expectations in divorce cases. On the one hand, the parties are likely to
start with acrimonious personal relations and deep skepticism as to each other's
fairness and trustworthiness. On other hand, divorce cases have perhaps the
most to gain in terms of surplus from unnegotiated reciprocal gestures that build
trust, since a good relationship with a former spouse has significant
psychological value to a client and will prove of enormous assistance in easing
their continuing connections, especially if there are children. 136 Traditional
lawyering does little to create this surplus; indeed, lawyers can even ~o so far as
to advise clients that they should try to "screw" their former spouses. 1 7
A recent trend known as "collaborative law" tries to steer divorcing parties
toward trusting and respecting relations in ways that bear similarities to the ethic
of high expectations." In collaborative law, the lawyers and parties commit to
good-faith negotiations, to the disclosure of all relevant information even if not
requested, and to switching to new counsel should either party decide to
litigate. 139 Clients who go through this process point to the impact on the
children as their main reason for doing so, 140 suggesting that they recognize the
surplus that comes from a comparatively amicable divorce process.
The development of collaborative divorce demonstrates that at least in some
cases, divorcing parties can draw upon principles of fairness, trust, and
reciprocity, and indeed some want to do so. The unconditional surrender of
certain interests by one party (even, Wedding Crashers suggests, interests as
small as frequent flyer miles) may well generate reciprocal gestures and move
the case toward a more successful resolution from all perspectives.
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Personal Injury

The ethic of high expectations may also have potential in personal injury
cases. A much-cited example involves the Veterans Affairs Medical Center
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136. See generally Gwyneth I. Williams, Looking at Joint Custody Through the Language and
Attitudes ofAttorneys, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 5-6 (2005) (discussing benefits of amicable settlements in
divorce cases).
137. Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 737, 757 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (describing a conversation between a lawyer and client in which the client expresses
an interest in making concessions and the lawyer responds that if she does that, she'll "have 40, 50,
60 years to say, 'Gee whiz, why didn't I want to screw him?"').
138. See William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 358 (2004).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 378 ("To gain insight into what interests clients bring to the process, they were
presented with eight possible factors and asked to rank these in order of importance to their decision
to try [collaborative law]. The most frequently ranked factor was 'impact on children,' selected by
44% of clients .... ").
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(Center) in Lexington, Kentucky 141 In 1987, the Center switched from a "deny
and defend" approach to medical errors to a policy of apologizing for errors and
in certain cases offering compensation/ 42 a change that has saved the Center
money. 143 Here, we see the ethic of high expectations in operation: the apology
has created surplus by its psychological benefits, reduced transaction costs by
making the parties more trusting and thus more likely to settle earlier, promoted
principles of fairness, and helped the parties have relatively good relations.
Several other hospitals have adopted a similar approach with similar results. 144
At least one set of studies suggests that apologies will also reduce the amount of
monetary compensation plaintiffs deem adequate in personal injury contexts
other than medical malpractice. 145 In sum, although more studies and examples
would be valuable, there is reason to think that the ethic of high expectations can
. I matter m
. th e personaI mJury
. .
work as a prac!Jca
context. 146
In identifying these three subject areas, I do not mean to suggest that all
cases within these areas will prove good candidates for the ethic of high
expectations. Nor do I mean to suggest that the ethic of high expectations carmot
be invoked in other areas of law. Rather, I offer these three very different areas
as examples of when the ethic of high expectations will sometimes serve the
lawyers and the parties well.

141. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247, 257-58
(2005) (discussing the Veterans Affair Medical Center example); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 349, 360 (2008)
(same); Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical Malpractice
Reform, 39 CONN. L. REV. 667,714 n.232 (2006) (citing SteveS. Kraman et al., John M Eisenberg
Patient Safety Awards: Advocacy: The Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 28 JOTNT
COMMISSION J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 646, 646 (2002)) (same).
142. See Cohen, supra note 141, at 257-58 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jonathan
R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM
URB. L.l. 1447, 1451-53 (2000)); Robbennolt, supra note 141, at 360.
143. See Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 142, at 1453 (noting that since the
change, the Center has had relatively low overall payouts compared to other veterans' medical
centers and that its cases have comparatively low litigation costs because they settle quickly).
144. See Robbennolt, supra note 141, at 360. Robbennolt also provides an interesting
discussion about the rise of state laws limiting or excluding the use of apologies in litigation. See
id. at 356-57.
145. See id. at 361-63 (citing Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 484, 515 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies
and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 341 (2006)) (describing a set of studies in
which participants were asked to assume that they were injured in a pedestrian-bicycle collision and
noting that apologies "influence[d] judgments that [were] directly related to legal settlement
decision making").
146. One further experiment by Robbennolt suggests that while injured persons may be
willing to accept less monetary compensation where they have also received an apology, plaintiffs'
attorneys do not view apologies as reducing the appropriate settlement value-indeed, if the
apologies are admissible evidence, they view these apologies as increasing the settlement value.
See id. at 376-77. This experiment suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys either consider that plaintiffs
should get all the benefits of the surplus generated by the apology or do not view the apologies as
generating surplus.
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There is an old story of an English barrister who, upon hearing that a
contentious inheritance dispute had settled, exclaimed in disgust, "Settled!
Settled! Think of it! All that magnificent estate frittered away on the
beneficiaries." 147 This cynical view is just one of conntless negative portrayals
of lawyers from ancient times to the present. 148 But against the cynics lies an
equally long line of defenders of the legal profession, many of whom are not
only lawyers but also great historical figures. To give but two examples,
Abraham Lincoln considered that "[a]s a peacemaker[,] the lawyer has a superior
opportunity of being a good man," 149 and Louis Brandeis claimed that the
practice of law offers "an opportunity for usefulness which is probably
unequalled." 150
In Sir William Patterson, Anthony Trollope has given us a model of the
lawyer-as-peacemaker par excellence: a "lawyer's lawyer, one to whom most
other lawyers, past middle age, with ambition, ideals and common sense, would
151
point as representing what they themselves would like to be."
Unlike the
barrister in the story above, Sir William seeks a resolution that will do the most
for the parties and the least for the lawyers. His methods are also nnlike that of
the barrister in the storyC-cwhile that barrister relishes the prospect of a court
battle, Sir William succeeds by moving the parties away from litigation through
his ethic of high expectations.
I have suggested in this Essay that lawyers today have something to gain
from studying Sir William's tactics. Long before dictator games, trust games,
and formal distinctions between social norms and market norms, Trollope used
Sir William to show that sometimes the best result for a client can be obtained by
stepping away from legal rights and explicit negotiations and instead focusing
the parties on principles of fairness, trust, and reciprocity. Even if it is only
pulled out in a modest subset of cases, this ethic of high expectations belongs in
every lawyer's briefcase.
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147. JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 62 (Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1938) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also HAZARD, supra note 3, at 133 (telling this story with slightly different wording).
148. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 283, 283-89 (1998) (recounting numerous examples of negative perspectives on lawyers
starting with the ancient Greeks).
149. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81, 81 (RoyP. Basler ed., 1953).
150. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address before the Harvard Ethical
Committee (May 4, 1905), in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313, 327 (August M.
Kelley reprint 1971) (I914).
151. Drinker, supra note 5, at 56.

